Country Reports on Terrorism 2012–Nigeria

Posted: June 3, 2013 in Uncategorized


Nigeria. While education indicators were poor nationwide, they were worse in the
predominantly Muslim north, where poor education contributed to the marginalization of Muslim communities. An estimated 10 million children were not enrolled in school, and with no vocational skills have little hope of ever joining the formal workforce. USAID implemented interventions that targeted both access to education services for the vulnerable, increased quality for those in school, and strengthened systems for increased accountability and transparency. In FY 2012, USAID worked in Islamic and Quranic schools benefitting 79,766 pupils (45,003 male and 34,763 female), out of which 15,190 (9,350 male; 5,840 female) were identified as orphans and vulnerable children. The vulnerable children received support materials to allow them to attend school. A total of 200 of these children acquire vocational and life skills annually by participating in the skills program.



Overview: The militant sect “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings
and Jihad,” better known by its Hausa name Boko Haram (BH), conducted killings, bombings,
kidnappings, and other attacks in Nigeria, resulting in numerous deaths, injuries, and the
widespread destruction of property in 2012. The states where attacks occurred more frequently included Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe, as well as the Federal Capital Territory. No terrorist attacks occurred in the southern states of Nigeria. Suspected BH attackers killed Nigerian government and security officials, Muslim and Christian clerics, journalists, and civilians. Of particular concern to the United States is the emergence of the BH faction known as “Ansaru,” which has close ties to AQIM and has prioritized targeting Westerners – including Americans – in Nigeria.


President Goodluck Jonathan appointed a new National Security Adviser (NSA) in June, with the mandate to improve the Nigerian government’s coordination, communication, and cooperation on counterterrorism matters, both domestically and internationally. Most operations to counter BH were headed up by the military-led Joint Task Force, some members and units of which committed indiscriminate and extrajudicial use of force, including killings of civilians and BH suspects. The Nigerian government’s efforts to address grievances among Northern populations, which include high unemployment and a dearth of basic services, continued to fail, as did the security forces’ efforts to contain BH. The United States called on the Nigerian government to employ a comprehensive security strategy that is not predicated on the use of force, and that also addresses the economic and political exclusion of vulnerable communities in the north.


Nigerian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation continued in 2012. In practice, the NSA retained the lead as coordinator of the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism strategy. In November, the Nigerian government formally requested assistance from the United States to develop an intelligence fusion center that would be able to streamline coordination and information sharing on counterterrorism matters among key agencies, including the State Security Service (SSS), the intelligence agencies, the national police, and the military. An inaugural working group to develop Nigeria’s intelligence fusion capability, composed of Embassy officials and staff of the

Office of the National Security Adviser, met on December 15 to determine how the United States can best support this initiative.


On December 31, 2011, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 15 local government areas in Borno, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states, which remained in effect throughout most of 2012. According to Nigerian government officials, the declaration of a state of emergency gives the government sweeping powers to search and arrest without warrants.


2012 Terrorist Incidents: Elements of BH increased the number and sophistication of attacks in 10 northern states and the Federal Capital Territory, with a notable increase in the lethality,capability, and coordination of attacks. Notable terrorist incidents committed by elements of BH,and factions claiming to be BH or affiliated with BH, included:


.On January 20, multiple near-simultaneous attacks in Kano were carried out on at least
12 targets including police stations, an immigration office, and the Kano residence of an
Assistant Inspector General of Police. Over 150 persons were killed and hundreds wounded.

.On January 26, a German construction worker was kidnapped on the outskirts of Kano city. On June 1, he was killed by his captors in a raid on the house where he was being held.


.On March 8, an Italian citizen and a British citizen who were kidnapped in May 2010 in
Kebbi state, were killed in Sokoto state by their captors during an attempted rescue by
Nigerian and British special forces.

.In April, assailants attacked Theatre Hall at Bayero University, Kano, with improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and gunshots, killing nearly 20 persons.

.On April 26, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) simultaneously
exploded at the offices of This Day newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna, killing five persons
and wounding many.

.On June 17, attacks on three churches in Kaduna state killed worshippers and instigated
violence throughout the state. At least 10 people were killed and an additional 78 injured
in the ensuing riots, as groups barricaded roads, burned mosques, and used machetes to
attack and kill. In response, the Kaduna state government imposed a 24-hour curfew and
deployed additional security forces; however, violence between Christians and Muslims
continued for nearly one week.

.In July, the assassination of three traditional Muslim leaders was attempted in Borno,
Yobe, and Kaduna states respectively. None of the targets was killed.

.On July 30, police stations and markets in Sokoto were attacked, resulting in the death of
six persons.

.In July and August, churches were targeted in Bauchi, Kaduna, and Kogi states. The total
killed in these attacks was 22 persons.

.On December 19, a French engineer was kidnapped in Katsina state, near the Niger
border. Ansaru, considered a splinter faction of BH, claimed the kidnapping, and the
victim’s whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.


Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The weakest aspect of the Prevention of
Terrorism Law of 2011 is that it does not clearly delineate the lead agency to investigate
suspected terrorist crimes.


The trial of six suspects accused of the Christmas Day 2011 bombing of a Catholic church at
Madalla in Niger state began in September and was ongoing at year’s end.


In February, a U.S. District Court sentenced Nigerian national Umar Abdulmutallab to life in prison for his unsuccessful attempt to detonate an explosive aboard a U.S.-flagged air carrier approaching Detroit, Michigan on December 25, 2009. Throughout the trial, the Nigerian government cooperated closely with DHS, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.


The Nigerian government actively cooperated with the United States and other international
partners to prevent further acts of terrorism in Nigeria against U.S. citizens, citizens of third countries, and Nigerian citizens.


Countering Terrorist Finance: Nigeria is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group
against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-
style regional body. Nigeria was publicly identified by the FATF in February 2010 for strategic anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism deficiencies. In October 2011,Nigeria was named in the FATF Public Statement for its lack of progress in implementing its action plan. In 2012, Nigeria made significant progress in addressing its outstanding deficiencies, including through the adoption of amendments to its Money Laundering (Prevention) Act.

While Nigeria regularly froze the assets of individuals and entities designated under relevant UNSCRs, and others designated by the United States under U.S. domestic designation authorities only, delays sometimes occurred. All requests to freeze assets must first be sent to the National Security Adviser, who disseminates the information to relevant financial institutions and Nigerian government agencies. Consequently, delays of up to four weeks occasionally occurred before authorities would block assets. Nigeria did not monitor non-profit organizations to prevent misuse and terrorist financing.


For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes:


Regional and International Cooperation: At the June 7 Ministerial Plenary Meeting of the
Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Nigeria announced it would partner with Switzerland
to co-host a Sahel Working Group meeting on combating the financing of terrorism in early
2013. In January, the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force launched three projectsunder the Integrated Assistance for Counter-Terrorism initiative to support Nigerian governmentefforts to combat terrorism. Nigeria is a lead member of the Economic Community of West African States and has committed ground forces and logistical support for a possible interventionforce in Mali. Through its Office of the National Security Adviser, Nigeria has taken a lead role in initiating a multilateral dialogue between regional countries on how they can better coordinate their efforts to confront networks of terrorist groups that span international borders.


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